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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
SUPER TIRE MARKE!', INC.,
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
CLYDE ROLLINS, d.b.a

CASE
(

NO. 10,581

ROLLINS MINE SUPPLY,
)
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE

This action was brought on an open account for tires
sold, with a defense interposed of a right to setoff for
breach of warranty of mileage to be received from such
tires.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER OOUBT

The trial court granted plaintiff-respondent judgment

upon the claim asserted in the complaint, without set-off.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-appellant requests reversal with order to
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that there is no evidence whatsoever to supi;x>rt the finding of the trial court

2
that there was no warranty given by respondent in connection with, the sale of the tires, or damages for breach
of that warranty, that substantial believable, competent,
evidence shows a breach of an express warranty, and damages for that breach exceed the sum claimed by resPondent.
STATEMENT OF FAcn
Appellant, doing btisine8s as Rollins Mine Supply, operates five l~ diesel tractor trucks on the highway between PrO\f9, Utah, and Carbon County, each truck Uiually making two trips per day (R. 102). Tires for these

trucks constitute a major operating expense (R. 67, 102).
From 1lhe time he began
from respondent until
the facts developed out of which this dispute arose, appellant purchased approximately one hundred tires from respondent (R. 68, 103).

purchases

the middle of 1962, appellant began complaining to Mr. Jack Jensen, ~esman f~ respondent, that the
tires he had purchased were not giving adequate mileage
(ft.. 89, 90). In response to these objections,· Mr. Jensen,
ort beNtlr of respondent, gave appellant an oral warranty
that the brand known as "Motrack" would give 75,000
miles wear, and the brand known as "Mighty Mo's" would
give 100,000 miles wear, or respondent would re-cap them
(R. 8.1, 83, 90, 1G4-5). Mr. Mike Billus, 1)Ile of the oWners
of respondent, (R. 156) instructed Mr. Jensen to make the
warranty (R. 85). The only representative of respondent
with which appellant dealt prior to the dispute on which
thiS actioo is rounded, was Mr. Jensen (R. 139). The auth0rity of Mr. Ju1sen to speak for respondent was not questimed at the trial.
~bout
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Subsequently, in early 1963, respondent refused to
honor the warranty as to mileage for thirty-two of the
tires which had given less than 50% of the mileage warranted, and appellant thereupon refused to pay the balance
owing upon the open Cl!CCOunt (R. 109-112). This action
was brought to recover on that open account. Appellant's
defense is a set-off for breach of an express warranty, the
set-off exceeding the amount of the claim.
The theory of appellant's defense is that there was a
breach of an express warranty as that term is defined in
Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act, Section 60-1-12, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. (It is remembered that this case
arose and was tried prior to the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code.)
Over objection, the trial court permitted a Mr. Ken
Stika to testify that as long as he had worked a:t the Provo
store, there had not been to his knowledge any waITanty
on the brand of tire known as "Motrack", that there had
been a 100,000 mile warranty on the brand known as
"Mighty Mo", that this warranty 'had been discontinued,
but he did not know when with respect to the sales to appellant (R. 152-4). He had nothing to do with the transactions between appellant and respondent and made no
sales to appellant (R. 153); Mr. Jensen did not work under
Mr. Stika and Mr. Stika had no supervisory position over
Mr. Jensen (R. 155-6) ; Mr. Stika did not know whether
Mr. Billus, an owner of respondent, and Mr. Jensen had
any conversations conceming warranting mileage to appellant (R. 156); and he knew nothing as to what went on
between management, other salesmen, and their customers (R. 156).

It is our position that Mr. Stika's testimony in rebuttal
on the trial was inadmissible. and in any event it had no
bearing on the question of the making of an express warranty to appellant.
On that record, the trial court (in one of the two sets
of findings of fact signed and entered by it), found that
there was no warranty as claimed by appellant, and entered judgment (again in two of three judgments entered
by it) for respondent.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRI·
AL COURTS FINDING OF FACT ON THE ISSUE OF
BREACH OF WARRANTY.
In the second set, chronologically, of findings of fact
and conclusions of law signed and entered by the trial
court is the following finding:

"3.

That on tires purchased during the above
stated period (the time when appellant pur·
chased from respondent) the tires were not
covered by any tYPe of waran.ty (sic) by
Plaintiff." (R. 29)

Our position is that there is simply nothing in the record to support that finding.
We are cognizant of the rule as stated in Lowe v. Rosealoff, 12 Utah 2d, 190, 364 P 2d 418:

"This court has stated on numerous occasions that
findings of fact made by the trial court will not be
disturbed so long as they are supported by substan·
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tial evidence. Therefore, the findings of the lower
court must be affirmed unless there was no reasonable
basis in the evidence on which rtlhe court could fairly
and rationally have thought the requisite proof was
met."
The cases we have found applying this rule generally
affirm the trial court in its finding based upon conflicting
evidence, sometimes observing, in passing, that the rule
applies. though the appellate court may be inclined to believe that testimony which conflicts with the facts as found
by the trial court.
In the case before this court there is no conflict in the

evidence. The record does not show a dispute of fact.
Counsel for respondent, on argUrnent before the trial
court, belabored Mr. Stika's testimony. OW' reSponse is
(1) that it was inadmissible and objected to, and (2) it
does not raiSe any conflict as regards the evidence supporting appellant's position that he was given an express
warranty that he would receive a guaranteed mileage from
tires sold.
It is remembered that Mr. Stika was merely another
employee of respondent, that he had nothing to do with
the sales to appellant or any business arrangement or transaction between respondent and appellant, that he lmew
nothing of possible arrangements or conversations between
Mr. Jensen, respondent's salesman, and either respondent
or appellant, and that he and Mr. Jensen had no business
connections other than a common employer (R. 153-6).
His testimony would have no bearing at all on the question whether, at a specfic time, and with express authority
from respondent, through one of its owners, Mr. Jensen
gave appellant an express warranty, or "guaranty", that
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appellant would receive a minimum mileage per tire, at
no cost over the purchase price. The record is replete and
uncontradicted, showing this latter statement to be the
fact (R. 80-87, 88, 90, 104-5).
It is of note, also, that when appellant, after this dispute arose, discussed settlement of the account with Mr.
Stika and also with Mr. Billus, an owner of respondent,
neither denied the warranty (R. 117, 119, 70).

POINT Il
RESPONDENT'S AGENT HAD ACfUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO WARRANT.

No evidence was offered to challenge Mr. Jensen's authority as agent for respondent to warrant mileage appellant should obtain from tires it sold to him. We therefore
believe this question may not be raised on appeal. However, counsel for respondent argued this before the trial
court, and we anticipate him here on the merits.
The subject of implied or apparent authority of an
agent selling personal property to make warranties is thoroughly treated by this court in Park v. lUoorman Mfg. Co.,
121 Utah 339, 241 P 2d 914, 40 A. L. R. 2d 273. See also
2 Williston on Sales (Rev. Ed.) 660-664, Sec. 445 and Sec.
445b.
We are not here concerned, as this court was concerned in the case of Park v. Moorman, supra, with an implied authority to warrant mileage to be given by the tires
sold. On cross examination Mr. Jensen testified:
"Q. Why did the one have 100,000 miles guaranty
and these 75,000 miles guaranty?
A. Because! Mike Billus (an owner of respond·
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ent, see R. 156) gave me instructions to give that
warranty.
Q. When?
A. When the tires were sold, before they were

sold.

(R.

When did Mike Billus tell you this?
A. Just before I sold them, over the telephone."
85).
Q.

It is our position respondent's agent had express authority to warrant mileage of tires sold appellant. He was
the only agent of respondent to deal with appellant. Had
Mr. Gill or Mr. Billus, owners of the respondent at the time
complained of and at the time of the trial CR. 156), or any·
one on their authority disputed this evidence, we would
not be on appeal. As with the evidence on the warranty,
the evidence on Mr: Jensen's authority to give it is tmdisputed.

POINT ID
APPELLANT'S DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WA&RA.""ITY EXCEED RESPONDENT'S CLAIM.
Appellant computed the amount he claims as set-off
by taking from the purchase price the same peircmtage
thereof as the actual miles obtained from each brand of

tires sold bore to the total mileage warranted in eaeh case
(R. 11-156). The theory was that the amount thus left
I'epresented the value of the mileage not delivered. This
amount is $1,431.60. The difference between this amount
and that of respondent's claim appeared, to appellant at
least, as oominal, and he as.c;erted his right by way of a
Plea in abatement rather than by way of counterdtim.
This, we submit, he had a right to do.
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Section 60-5-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, proVides:
Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election:
(a) Accept or keep the goods, and set up against
the seller the breach of warranty by way of recoup.
ment in dimunition or extinction of the price;
(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintan an
action against the seller for damages for the breach
of warranty;

"(1)

(7) In the case of breach of warranty of qualty, such loss, . . . is the difference between the value
of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and
the value they would have had if they had answered
to the warranty."

Appellant received forty-five percent orf the mileage
warranted (R. 126). He ought not to be required to pay
for one hundred percent of the merehandise as warranted.
CONCLUSION

The post trial proceedings in this case are of interest.
On January 21, 1965, the court signed and entered a judg~~nt for respondent, unsupported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law (R. 19). On February 24, 1965, the
court apparently signed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, finding the warranty was given, and signed and
entered a judgment of no cause of action (R. 26-8). On
March 1, 1965, the court signed and entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law, finding no warranty and con·
eluding respondent was entitled to judgment (R. 29-30),
and on Maoch 23, 1965, he signed and entered a judgment
pursuant thereto (R. 33) .
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This appears irresolute; a careful analysis of the judgment roll, including minute entries, would disclose its basis.
The significance of this here is its disclosure of the
Jack of attention given this case by the trial court.
The record presents no evidence refuting appellant's
position that he was given an express warranty as to quality of the tires sold him by one with authority so to do,
and that he received a product not possessing this quality.
If this court will affirm a finding where there is some competent evidence to support it, then we believe it should reverse a finding of fact when made in the face of competent, admissible, substantial and unrefuted evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Attorney for Appellant

